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This paper attempts to explore a Hegelian account of BuddhistEnlightenment in the context of the subitism/gradualism debate in Mahayana Buddhism. It will argue in light of Hegelian immanent tele­
ology that Buddhist transcendental enlightenment (the end) must be un­
derstood in terms of “ inclusion” or “ sublation,” but not “ annihila­
tion,” of the process of cultivation (the means). In other words, the 
problem of the relation of the means to the end, i.e., of the cultivation 
and the enlightenment must be worked out dialectically, not emptied 
out unilaterally. The very spirit of the Buddhist renunciation of the 
dualism of the subject and the object, of the end and the means, would 
in turn make itself dualistic if the transcendence of the enlightenment 
were to be separated from the means.
The ultimate end (Telos) of both Buddhist subitism and Hegelian 
teleology is to be understood in terms of nonbifurcation of the end and 
the means. However, the difficulty in subitism is that its “ immediate” 
nonbifurcation of the end (enlightenment) with the means (cultivation) 
ironically “ re-bifurcates” the two on account of its annihilation of the 
gradual aspect of the means. Thus I would argue in light of Hegelian 
teleology that the true sense of enlightenment must be dialectically un­
derstood in such a way that the enlightenment (the end) includes cultiva­
tion (the means) as necessary to its self-actualization in concrete and de­
terminate terms. In other words, the silence of subitist enlightenment
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cannot articulate itself if it annihilates its necessary counterpart of 
speech.
There is to be found, from the outset, a similarity between the 
Hegelian immanent teleology of the Absolute Spirit and the Buddhist 
teleology o f Enlightenment in that the end is not to be taken as some­
thing external to the means; in other words, the means to the end is 
already inherent in the end, and to that extent the end is already 
achieved in the means, or the end is also achieving itself in the means. 
Hegel would agree with subitism to the extent that the preliminary act 
o f enlightenment is already enlightenment itself; however, Hegel would 
argue that the premise of the initial identification of the end and the 
means does not necessarily negate the gradual aspect of enlightenment, 
i.e., all the means o f cultivation or practice. This is to say that the im­
mediate identification o f enlightenment and cultivation, i.e., the end 
and the means, is a necessary factor, but not a sufficient one. The inher­
ent, the immediate, must be further developed into the explicit, a 
mediated actuality. The true identification of the means and the end 
does not “ obliterate”  the subsequent processes from the former to the 
latter; rather the means must be “ sublated”  in such a way that in the 
end, nothing is lost, but all are included. As Ken Wilber says, “ Each 
higher fact must transcend yet include each lower level in its higher- 
order unity and synthesis. To negate everything is to preserve every­
thing; to transcend all is to include all.” 1
I. THE DEBATE BETWEEN SUBITISM AND GRADUALISM
Let us now examine the fundamental problems in the Buddhist debate 
between subitism and gradualism. Enlightenment is characterized by 
subitism in terms of “ suddenness”  or “ immediacy” ; no previous en­
gagement o f practice or cultivation is required to achieve it. As Whalen 
Lai puts it, “ Enlightenment is both sudden in approach and total in im­
pact.” 2 The subitists insist that true enlightenment is one that tran­
scends any progressive cultivation in such a way that it is attained “ sud­
denly”  or “ immediately”  without verbal or philosophical articulation,
1 Ken Wilber, Up from Eden (Boston: Shambhala, 1985), p. 310; see also p. 315.
2 Whalen Lai, “Tao-sheng’s Theory o f Sudden Enlightenment Re-examined,” in 
Sudden and Gradual Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought, ed. Peter N. 
Gregory (Kuroda Institute Studies in East Asian Buddhism, 1987), p. 15.
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and without the mediation of cultivation. The silence of apophaticism 
is the only true sign of enlightenment. This “ suddenness” (don, in 
Korean, tun in Chinese), which implies “ intuitivity,” “ immediacy,” 
“ nontemporality” and thus “ the mystical”  and “ the transcendental,” 
involves two terms: the means and the end, i.e., the cultivation and the 
enlightenment.
Gradualism, on the other hand, teaches that enlightenment requires 
gradual cultivation, practices, moral pursuits, meditative practices, 
and intellectual disciplines, all of which are to be renounced according 
to subitists. However, there are common teachings they both agree on. 
As Demteville claims both believed that the intrinsic purity of the 
mind, while pure in its self-nature, is soiled by “ adventitious pas­
sions.” 3
I will argue on the basis of the Platform Sutra o f  the Sixth Patriarch, 
which is the textual foundation of the two philosophical constructs, 
that the exclusive, transcendentalistic, mystical subitism needs to be 
complemented by inclusive gradualism in order to complete its own 
self-concept. I will argue further, however, that although gradualism is 
more in accord with the spirit of the Sixth Patriarch than subitism on 
account of its inclusivism, it falls short of articulating a logical explana­
tion of the dialectical interplay of cultivation and enlightenment, i.e., 
the means and the end. Therefore, I will examine the problem in light 
of the immanent teleology of Hegel in order to suggest ways in which 
Buddhists might be able to articulate more clearly the relation between 
means and ends in the process of enlightenment.
I would like to draw careful attention to the fact that the Platform 
Sutra, which is the authentic textual resource out of which the problem 
of the subitism and gradualism emerges, is, in fact, dual-faceted. 
Neither subitism nor gradualism alone can be said to be a fair account 
of enlightenment. On my reading, the Sutra clearly manifests a “ dialec­
tical,”  not “ exclusive” or “ unilateral,”  affirmation of “ both “ grad­
ualism and subitism. Let me thus proceed to a detailed textual analysis.
Author of the sutra Hui-neng, the sixth patriarch, says that there is 
neither suddenness nor gradualism in the Dharma; but in the capacity
3 Paul Demitville, “The Mirror of the Mind,’* Sudden and Gradual Approaches to 
Enlightenment in Chinese Thought, p. 15.
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of the people who pursue the Enlightenment there is a methodological 
distinction between “ sudden”  and “ gradual.”  The Sutra thus says: 
[161 Good friends, in the Dharma there is no sudden or grad­
ual, but among people some are keen and others dull (italics 
mine). The deluded recommend the gradual method, the en­
lightened practice the sudden teaching. To understand the 
original mind o f yourself is to see into your own original na­
ture. Once enlightened, there is from the outset no distinction 
between these two methods; those who are not enlightened 
will for long kalpas be caught in the cycle o f transmigration.4
4 Ibid., 137; italics mine.
5 Ibid., 193.
[39] W hat is meant by “ gradual”  and “ sudden” ? The Dhar­
ma itself is the same, but in seeing it there is a slow way and a 
fast way. Seen slowly, it is the gradual; seen fast it is the sud­
den [teaching]. Dharma is without sudden or gradual, but 
some people are keen and others dull; hence the names “ sud­
den”  and “ gradual.” 5
It is not difficult to see from the above two passages that there are 
two methods (the means) to enlightenment (the end), i.e., sudden and 
gradual, which, without doubt, supports gradualism. However, in 
other passages Hui-neng says something different. For example, in pas­
sage 29 he says:
When people of shallow capacity (so-kun-ki) hear the Sudden 
Doctrine being preached they are like the naturally shallow- 
rooted plants on this earth, which, after a deluge o f rain, are 
all beaten down and cannot continue their growth. People of 
shallow capacity are like such plants. Although these people 
have prajna  wisdom and arc not different from men of great 
knowledge, why is it that even though they hear the Dharma 
they are not awakened? It is because the obstructions of their 
heterodox views are heavy and the passions deep-rooted. It is 
like the times when great clouds cover the sun; unless the 
wind blows the sun will not appear. There is no large and  
small in prajna wisdom (italics mine). Because all sentient
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beings have of themselves deluded minds, they see the Bud­
dha by external practice, and are unable to awaken to their 
own natures. But even these people of shallow capacity, if 
they hear the Sudden Doctrine, and do not place their trust in 
external practices (italics mine), but only in their own minds 
always raise correct views in regard to their own original na­
tures; even these sentient beings, filled with passions and trou­
bles, will at once gain awakening.6 7
6 Ibid.; italics mine.
7 All italics in this text are mine.
As shown above, passages 16 and 29 do not coincide. In passage 16, 
the Sutra asserts that people differ in their capacities for enlightenment, 
so that it defines the difference between gradualism and subitism in 
terms of people’s capacities. However, in passage 29, the sutra con­
tradicts the former position, and says that even lower capacity people 
can attain enlightenment “ suddenly.”
My understanding of these two inconsistent passages runs as fol­
lows. If the former argument is right, then, “ the lower capacity peo­
ple” must not be thought of “ lower”  but as “ the higher capacity peo­
ple” ; but if latter argument is right, then passage 16 must be saying 
that there is no difference in the degrees of capacity regarding enlighten­
ment. My interpretation of this inconsistency is that the Sutra intends 
to “ encourage” subitism as the best instruction for the attainment of 
the enlightenment, but not to “ dismiss” gradualism on account of the 
former. This should be clear from what is said about the two paths to 
enlightenment, gradual and sudden, that enlightenment itself is neither 
gradual nor sudden.
The Sutra maintains that there are two kinds of teachings, dono- 
donsu (sudden enlightenment—sudden cultivation) and dono-chQmsu 
(sudden enlightenment—gradual cultivation), the former being more 
authentic and superior, and the latter being inferior. However, it does 
not say that the latter is wrong or unacceptable. In another passage 
where gradualistic well as subitistic factors can be found, Hui-neng 
says:
[53J If only within your self-nature you yourself separate 
from the five desires, the instant1 you see into your own na-
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ture—this is the True [Buddha]. If in this life you awaken to 
the teaching of the Sudden Doctrine, Awakening, you will see 
the World-honored One before your eyes.
If you do not seek the True yourself and seek the Buddha out­
side,
All your seeking will be that of a highly ignorant man.
The teaching of the Sudden Doctrine (donkyo bupmuri) has 
come from the West.
To save people of the world you must practice (italics mine) 
yourself.
[53] If within your own nature you seek to see for yourself, 
This then is the cause8 (italics mine) of becoming Buddha and 
gaining enlightenment.
If you wish to practice and say you seek the Buddha, 
Who knows where you will find the True [One]?
If within your own body you yourself have the True, 
Where the True is, there is the means (italics mine) of becom­
ing Buddha.9
As we have seen, practice and cultivation are encouraged by the 
author of the Sutra. The gradual aspect of sudden enlightenment can­
not be overlooked, for practice, by definition, needs something to prac­
tice for, and this again proves the gradual, process character in “ en­
lightenment.”  So it may be right to say that qfter enlightenment there 
need be no more practice, as subitism argues. But is it not the case that 
practice is needed until enlightenment is achieved?
The ambiguity of subitism and gradualism may be clearer from the 
perspective of a distinction between the what-ness and how-ness of en­
lightenment. Subitism seems to say that true enlightenment has to do 
only with the status or what-ness of it, but not its how-ness, the process 
of attaining it. The fact of the matter is that as far as the what-ness of 
enlightenment is concerned, gradualism does not differ from subitism. 
The difference lies in how to attain the same what-ness of enlighten-
s It  seems to me that “ seed”  here is a better translation than “ cause.”
9 The Platform Sutra o f  the Sixth Patriarch, trans. Philip Yampolsky (New York: 
Columbia University, 1967), p. 181.
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ment. In the how-ness of it, there are two factors involved: one is a mat­
ter of “ temporality”  and “ endurance,” which leads to the problem of 
immediacy versus mcdiacy. The other factor involved is the practical 
method (or means) for attaining enlightenment.
Subitists seem to conflate the status, the what-ness of sudden enlight­
enment, at the expense of the process, the how-ness, of the end. Grad­
ualism does not seem to deny the status of enlightenment, but it simply 
emphasizes the processes to the end by articulating the necessary 
stages. The difference between gradualism and subitism, then, may not 
be located in the end or what-ness of the final enlightenment; rather, it 
may be the means, or how-ness, of it. And this how-ness seems to be de­
termined by where the emphasis is placed. Gradualism emphasizes the 
means, a cultivation which must be gradual, while subitism emphasizes 
the end, which is sudden.
Now the term, dono (sudden enlightenment) needs some clarifica­
tion. The term, dono, in the context of dono-chtlmsu (sudden enlight­
enment-gradual cultivation), does not seem to be the same kind of 
dono as subitism defines, i.e., kyon-song, the completed enlighten­
ment. It is only the initial, embryonic, incomplete enlightenment, and 
thus secular distress, anguish, and afflictions still linger in it. There­
fore, an eradication of the distress and afflictions through gradual culti­
vation is needed. And subitism does not differ from gradualism in this 
respect. So if the fundamental problem is a matter of clarification of 
the definitions, then the reconciliation of the two schools would seem 
to lie in simply changing the term dono-cht2msu to haeo-chQmsu-dono 
(initial enlightenment—gradual cultivation—final, sudden enlighten­
ment).
Subitism says that if enlightenment is sudden, then, cultivation must 
be sudden too. The term dono-donsu, sudden enlightenment and sud­
den cultivation, would thus seem a contradiction in terms, since “ culti­
vation”  by definition involves temporality, i.e., duration, and duration 
cannot be “ an immediate moment,”  no matter how short a period of 
time. It may be plausible to say that the “ moment” of awakening is 
immediate, but it does not seem to right to say that “ cultivation”  or 
“ practice” has an immediate feature. Therefore subitism must main­
tain either that (1) there is an embryonic moment of enlightenment and 
the gradual cultivation, and perfected enlightenment may be achieved 
by these two features; or, (2) there is only perfected enlightenment
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from the beginning and the end, and no mediative moments between 
them is necessary.
The alternative given to subitism seems to be, then, that either it has 
to agree with the gradualist’s dono-chtimsu, sudden enlightenment and 
gradual cultivation, given that gradualist enlightenment is embryonic 
and not perfected as subitism contends, or it must say simply, dono, 
sudden enlightenment, without donsu attached to it because no cultiva­
tion is necessary. But this is impossible, both logically and actually. 
Subitism thus may be guilty of trying to “ have its cake and eat it, too.” 
Park Sungbae expresses his difficulty in accepting subitism’s unelab­
orated doctrine of dono-donsu on account of its exclusivism,10 1 and 
his proposed syncretism of “ subitistic gradualism”  donodonsujbk 
chumsusdl),n  seems to be a possible solution to the problem of the 
exclusivism of subitism. In line with Professor Park’s syncretism, I 
would like to propose, as a  (not the) possible solution to the problem, 
donochamsusebk donsusebl, or haeo-chQmsu-dono, that is, a “ gradu­
alistic subitism”  whose character is inclusive.
10 Park Sungbae, 4‘Criticism o f Songchol Sunim’s Account o f DonochOmsu,” in 
KkaedalQm, Donochamsu or Donodonsu? (Seoul: Minjoksa, 1992), p. 269.
11 Park Sungbae, “ Donodonsujok Chumsusol,”  in KkaedalQm, Donochamsu or 
Donodonsu?, p. 276.
II. HEGELIAN THREEFOLD IMMANENT TELEOLOGY
I would like to examine this haeo-chQmsu-dono (gradualistic subitism) 
in light of Hegelian immanent teleology which consists of three 
aspects, or moments: the immediate, the mediate, and the mediated- 
immediate. Inclusive subitism as Hegelian Absolute Idea has three 
features: (1) gradualism’s embryonic enlightenment, which is sudden 
and immediate; (2) gradual cultivation, which is mediated; and (3) 
subitism’s perfected enlightenment, which must be understood as the 
“ mediated immediacy,” i.e., immediacy actualized through and in 
mediation.
Subitism seems to annihilate the means to the end of enlightenment 
as an irrelevant factor because of its emphasis on the nontemporal, im­
mediate feature of enlightenment. On the other hand, for Gradualism, 
the means is much emphasized as a necessary factor in the attainment
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of enlightenment. Subitism further insists that the means are only for 
those of lower capacity with no direct access to enlightenment, whereas 
those who have superior capacity can achieve immediate, direct enlight­
enment. But this exposes a logical gap in the thought of subitism, for 
how can there be no means to the end when there is the end? Lin-chi, a 
subitist, resolves this difficulty of the logical jump by saying that the bi­
furcation of the means and the end can be bridged by means of the iden­
tification of “ enlightenment itself” with “ faith-in-enlightenment.” 
Robert Buswell says, “ Faith, for Lin-chi, is both the means and the 
end of practice, the catalyst of enlightenment as well as its consumma­
tion. When all doubts about inherent Buddhahood are resolved 
through the perfection of faith, faith and enlightenment are realized to 
be coextensive.” 12 However, the Lin-chian method of nonbifurcation 
of the means and the end in terms of faith, as identified with enlighten­
ment itself, does not seem to be quite convincing, for “ faith-in-enlight- 
enment” and the very status of “ enlightenment itself” cannot be the 
same. Faith in this respect, regardless as to whether it is with respect to 
“ I can become Buddha”  or “ I am already Buddha,”  does not make 
much difference.13 *15
12 Robert E. Buswell Jr. “The Short-cut Approach of K’an-hua Meditation: The
Evolution o f Practical Subitism in Chinese Ch’an Buddhism/’ in Sudden and Gradual
Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought, p. 342.
15 Park Sungbae argues that patriarchal faith’s *T am already Buddha,”  in contrast 
to the doctrinal faith’s *T can become Buddha.” is what is the right way to get us 
access to enlightenment; see his Buddhist Faith and Sudden Enlightenment (Albany: 
State University of New York Press. 1983); see p. 19 and also p. 133ff.
Thus, Lin-chi’s immediate identification of the means with the end 
of the enlightenment in terms of “ faith as enlightenment” may serve 
only as a partially correct methodology for solving this difficulty. Faith 
is necessary but not sufficient for enlightenment. The subitistic, immedi­
ate identification of the means with the end lacks the holistic, integral 
frame of the teleology of enlightenment. Hegel, in his immanent teleo­
logy, argues, as the subitists do, that the end is “ immediately”  identical 
with the means in the sense that the end is inherently in the means. 
However, Hegel says the nondifferentiated immediacy must go through 
the stage of differentiation by means of the mediate and the deter­
minate, otherwise the immediate will remain abstract and insipid. This
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Hegelian dialectical exposition of the immediate and the mediate can 
illuminate the difficulty of the means and end relationship in the one­
sided, exclusive, and solipsistic subitism.
Let us now elaborate the Hegelian dialectic of the immediate and the 
mediated in detail. Hegel advocates a form of intuitionism which, like 
subitism, asserts the reality of immediate knowledge. Immediate 
knowledge is what consists in knowing that the Infinite, the Eternal, 
the God which is in our Idea, really is; or, it asserts that our conscious­
ness is immediately and inseparably bound up with this idea of the cer­
tainty of its actual being. However, Hegel says that what is immediate 
is likewise mediated, and that immediacy itself is essentially mediated 
just as there is no cause without its effect, viz., the cause is mediated by 
the effect.14 Hegel argues that even from a purely logical point of view, 
immediacy without the mediate cannot be possible, for “ the Idea has 
truth only by means of being, and being has truth only by means of the 
Idea.** And when these two terms are united, one term has truth only 
when mediated through the other. This quality of mediation is in­
volved in the very immediacy of intuition.15
14 For an extensive discussion of the immediate-mediated relationship, see G. W. F. 
Hegel, Logic: Being Part One o f  the Encyclopaedia o f  the Philosophical Sciences 
(1830), trans. William Wallace (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 155ff; here­
after as Encyclopaedia.
15 Encyclopaedia, section 70.
16 G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy o f  Religion, ed. Peter C. Hodgson 
(Los Angeles: University o f California Press, 1988), pp. 155-156.
17 Ibid., p. 161.
According to Hegel, pure immediate knowledge is an empty abstrac­
tion. Not only is the pure immediacy abstract, but so also is pure media­
tion. In other words, one must not hold the opinion that either of them 
is truth in isolation. True knowledge is what unites both of them within 
itself and does not exclude either.16 17 Hegel insists that the immediacy of 
knowledge by no means excludes mediation. We cannot point to any­
thing at all that does not contain mediation within itself.
Hegel’s dialectical exposition of the immediate and the mediate is fur­
ther related to his concept of infinity. Since Hegel’s teleology is based 
on his conception of infinity, I shall elaborate his distinction between 
bad and true infinity. Bad infinity is something external to the finite in 
such a way that the moment when the finite reaches the infinite as the
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end, the infinite becomes another finite means to reach another infinite, 
and so on infinitely. This endless progression to infinity, which is set up 
as an unattainable external infinity, is negative and abstract. Hegel ar­
gues that this bad infinity must be overcome:
Something becomes an other; this other is itself somewhat; 
therefore it likewise becomes an other, and so on ad infini­
tum. This infinity is the wrong or negative infinity: it is only a 
negation of a finite: but the finite rises again the same as ever, 
and is never got rid of and absorbed.18
Hegel argues that the infinite in its endless progression into infinity is 
bad infinity and must be “ sublated” into the true infinite. The true 
infinite is not the mere negation of the finite. It is the infinite which 
has realized itself and actualized itself in the concrete finite, i.e., self* 
related in the passage, and in the other.19 In other words, to Hegel, 
the second stage of differentiation through mediation is a necessary 
aspect of the final end. Thus, for Hegel, nondifferentiated, immediate 
unity, like the “ night in which all cows are black,”  is blind, implicit 
unity, a mere abstraction. The Absolute Spirit has to be concretized 
through mediation in order to be truly absolute. Thus, as “ the owl 
of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk,” 20 so 
is the end achieved only after all the concrete means are practiced, not 
obliterated, and this understanding of the end can be true to the Bud­
dhist sudden enlightenment in which the end and the means are immedi­
ately identical.
Like the infinity of God of the poet Haller, Hegel says the true 
infinite is “ more than a mere world beyond the finite, and that we, in 
order to become conscious of it, must renounce that progressus in 
infinitum. ” 21 Haller writes:
I heap up monstrous numbers, mountains of millions; I pile 
up time upon time, and world on top of world; and when
11 Encyclopaedia, section 94.
”  Ibid., section 95
20 G . W . F . Hegel, Philosophy o f Right, trans. T . M . Knox (London, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 13.
21 Encyclopaedia, section 194.
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from the awful height I cast a dizzy look towards Thee, all the 
power of number, multiplied a thousand times, is not yet one 
part of Thee. These I remove, and thou liest all before me.22
As God described by Haller is present to and in us as soon as we aban­
don our external journey to find him, so “ is there, present before us 
the true infinite. It is only the spurious infinite which is the beyond.” 2* 
This analogy made by Haller is strikingly similar to the analogy of seek­
ing the Buddha made by the subitist Lin-chi:
When your seeking mind comes to rest, you are at ease—a no­
ble man. If you seek him [a Buddha], he retreats farther and 
farther away; if you don’t seek him, then he’s right there be­
fore your eyes, his wondrous voice resounding in your ears.24
Subitism’s warning against gradualism is similar to this Hegelian 
warning against bad infinity. According to subitism, gradualists set up 
enlightenment as an external goal to be achieved, and once the goal of 
enlightenment is set up as something external, then there has to be an 
endless progress to attain it. So subitism argues that the goal of enlight­
enment must be realized inwardly. Because it is within us, it does not 
have to be sought through gradual cultivation, and thus is achieved 
“ suddenly.” The Platform Sutra o f the Sixth Patriarch says that the 
truly enlightened person does not set up anything external in order to 
attain enlightenment. It says:
[41] The master said: “ Listen to my explanation and you will 
know my view. The mind-ground, not in error is the precept 
(kye) of self-nature; the mind-ground, undisturbed, is the 
meditation (chung) of self-nature; the mind-ground, not ig­
norant, is the wisdom (hye) of self-nature.”
Master Hui-neng said: “ Your precepts, meditation, and 
wisdom are to encourage people of shallow capacities, mine 
are for men of superior attainments. [Because] the awakening 
of self-nature [is the pivot of my teaching], I  don *t even set up 
precepts, meditation, and wisdom.”  (italics mine)
“  Ibid., section 104.
23 O. W. F. Hegel, Science o f  Logic, trans. A . V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: 
Humanities Press International, 1990), p. 149
24 The Record o f  Lin-chi (Kyoto: Institute o f Zen Studies, 1975), p. 19.
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Chih-ch’eng said: “ Please explain what you mean by 'not 
set u p 'y  (italics mine)
The master said: “ Self-nature is without error, distur­
bance, and ignorance. Every thought puts forth the radiance 
of prajna wisdom, and when one is always separated from 
the form of things, what is there that can be set up? Self­
awakening to self-nature, and sudden practice with sudden 
awakening—there is nothing gradual in them, so that nothing 
at all is set up.
But it is not fair to accuse gradualists of being externalists because 
the inward journey does not necessarily preclude cultivation. What is 
internal must be cultivated just as what is external. Therefore, iden­
tifying the necessity of cultivation with externalism is mistaken, and 
criticizing gradualism as a misconception is inappropriate. Just as 
the Hegelian Absolute Spirit, without being an external goal to be 
achieved, goes through the process of self-actualization within, like­
wise the inner goal has to go through as much cultivation as the exter­
nal goal. The Hegelian ultimate enlightenment, the Absolute Spirit, 
presupposes its end as its beginning and becomes fully Absolute only 
by its process of self-actualization in concrete and determinate mo­
ments. Seeking within oneself to become Buddha is not the same as be­
coming Buddha instantly. In other words, seeing Buddha within does 
not necessarily result in immediate enlightenment. Internal realization 
and sudden realization are two different categories. The former is 
about what and where, i.e., the content of enlightenment, viz., the Bud­
dha is within, not without; and the latter is about the how of enlighten­
ment. Though we accept that Buddha is within, we still must take time 
and expand effort to have the knowledge of the where-ness and what- 
ness of Buddha, and this in turn requires gradual cultivation.
The twofold dialectic of the means and the end of Buddhist enlight­
enment seems imperfect because of its unilateral conception of tran­
scendence, i.e., a total annihilation of the means. If Hegel is right, the 
transcendence of the Buddhist enlightenment is one that includes, 
preserves, and sublates the means, but does not obliterate it. If the Bud­
dhist teleology of enlightenment is thus twofold, then the Hegelian tele­
ology is thus threefold. The end is reached in three stages; first, the Sub­
jective End, which is present immediately; second, the Objective End,
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which is in process of being accomplished; and third, Realized End 
which is what is accomplished. The Subjective End is a nondifferentiat­
ed, self-identical universality, in which everything is involved, but noth­
ing is as yet discriminated.23 Like the initial enlightenment of gradual­
ism, the Subjective End is the immediate, implicit form of the end. The 
Objective End, i.e., the Subjective End identical with the particularity 
and the content, is thrown into the object, which it appropriates as 
a Means.26 Like the gradualist’s cultivation, the Objective End is a 
mediated differentiation from the immediate, undifferentiated end. 
The purposive action, with its Means, is still directed outwards because 
the End is also not identical with the object.27 Finally, the Realized End 
is the overt unity of Subjective End and the Objective End.28 In the 
Realized End, the one-sided subjectivity and the independent objectivi­
ty confronting it are both canceled.29 In the Realized End the means 
vanishes, for objectivity (the means) is the Subjective End’s return into 
itself. Hegel says that the means is the end itself when the means vanish 
in the Realized End: “ The realized end is also the means, and converse­
ly the truth of the means is just this, to be itself a real end, and the first 
sublating of objectivity is already also the second, just as the second 
proved to contain the first, as well.” 30
Thus, in light of Hegelian immanent teleology, the true end is not 
some thing that is separated from the means, but is what unfolds itself 
as being identical with it. The end is not some thing to be achieved, 
separated from the means, but rather is already achieved, or achieving 
itself, that is to say, the means to the end is the very end itself. The true 
end is not an endpoint which comes at the last moment after the means 
which makes the progress toward it. It is the whole process of activity 
itself, from the beginning point to the endpoint.
The subitistic immediate identity of the mind of sentient beings with 
that of the Buddha is likened to the Hegelian Subjective End which is 
only the first stage among the other two necessary stages of the Objec­
tive End and the Realized End. Subitists, however, skip the second
u  Encyclopaedia, section 206z.
M Ibid., section 208.
27 Ibid., section 209.
a  Ibid., section 210.
”  Ibid., section 212.
30 Science o f  Logic, p. 752.
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stage of the mediated, Objective End, and reach directly to the final 
stage, the Realized End.
Let me now expand the discussion on the immediacy of subitism in 
light of the Hegelian Subjective End.
As Professor Park argues in supporting the subitist’s immediacy in 
his triple identity of faith, practice, and enlightenment, faith is not a 
mere preliminary to practice and enlightenment, as it is assumed to be 
in the theory of doctrinal faith; rather, faith is practice and practice is 
enlightenment.31 Putting it in Aristotelian terms, one becomes virtu­
ous, not at the end of all the practices of virtue, nor as a result of them 
either; rather one becomes virtuous at the very moments of acting virtu­
ously.
31 See S. Park, Buddhist Faith and Sudden Enlightenment, pp. 6 and 56.
32 Hegel, in his Logic, section 40, says, “ Kant undertook to examine how far the 
forms o f  thought were capable o f leading to the knowledge o f  truth. In particular he 
demanded a criticism o f the faculty o f cognition as preliminary to its exercise. That is a 
fair demand, if it means that even the forms o f thought must be made an object o f  in­
vestigation. Unfortunately there soon creeps in the misconception o f  already knowing 
before you know—the error o f  refusing to enter the water until you have learnt to 
swim. True, indeed, the forms o f  thought should be subjected to a scrutiny before they 
are used; yet what is this scrutiny but ipso fac to  a cognition?”
This position is akin to the first moment of the Hegelian threefold 
teleology, i.e., the immediate identification of the means and the end. 
Hegel would support this in his warning against the Kantian misconcep­
tion of “ not knowing before you know.” Refuting the Kantian onto­
logical suspension of human faculty of knowledge of Ding-an-Sich, 
Hegel argues that the knowledge involved in the examination of 
knowledge is actual knowledge and not merely preliminary to actual 
knowledge.32 Like the subitist’s immediate identification of the end and 
the means, the Hegelian infinite is immediately inherent in the finite in 
the beginning.
Hegel, however, goes further than subitism in that the immediate 
presence of the infinite in the finite must go through the moments of de­
termination and concreteness. In other words, the inherent immediacy 
of enlightenment must be explicitly concretized and determined. The su­
bitist’s realization that the end is in the means, a renunciation of dual­
ism, does not necessarily imply that no process of self-determination 
and concreteness is needed. Hegel says that the true infinite, which in
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the beginning is present in the finite in the form of the indeterminate, 
must determine itself in the self-actualizing process in order to be truly 
infinite in the higher or perfected sense of the term. This teleological ac­
tivity is one that actualizes the original identification of the end with 
the beginning, the consequent with the ground, the effect with the 
cause. Pure identity without the activity of actualization, as alleged in 
subitism, is only abstract, and not real.33
III. SONY ATA: THE NEGATIVE ULTIMATE
If we consider the subitistic ultimate, fQnyata, emptiness, in light of 
Hegelian threefold teleology, we realize that “ abstract emptiness” is 
an immediacy that has not gone through moments of mediation through 
the means. In other words, the immediate end present in the means 
must be the fulfilled end in which the means and mediation are 
preserved, not annihilated.34 The pure immediacy of enlightenment, in 
which all concreteness, determination and cultivation are extinguished 
or removed by abstraction, must be sublated by mediation (the means). 
This, then, is the fulfilled, perfected, completed enlightenment.
I argue in line with Hegel that intelligibility in all cases—including 
Buddhist “ enlightenment” —presupposes “ determinacy”  which is 
overlooked in subitism. And Buddhist “ emptiness”  (fQnyatQ) will be 
merely “ empty-emptiness” if it does not involve itself with the mediat­
ed, concretized moments of determinacy.
The very fact that subitism overlooks the second stage of the end, 
i.e., the determinate or mediated, makes it fall into the trap of the solip- 
sistic “ inward journey”  into the immediate-immediate which then 
results in negating things in particular as “ transitory”  or “ ephemer­
al.”  Hegel’s main criticism of Buddhism in general is precisely this 
“ negative ultimate,” i.e., “ emptiness” to which no “ determinacy” of 
any sort whatsoever is applicable.35 Along these same lines I argue that 
the Buddhist’s total renunciation of anything mediated or determinate 
into “ immediate” “ emptiness” must also be “ emptied.”
Hegel seems right in saying that the individual and the particular
”  See Hegel, Science o f  Logic, pp. 148-149 and 748.
54 Ibid., pp. 753.
55 See Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy o f  Religion, pp. 254-257.
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are emptied out for the sake of the nondifferentiated negative uni­
versal “ emptiness” in Buddhism, whereas in Western religion (Judaeo- 
Christianity in Hegel’s point of view) the individual and the determi­
nate are “ worked out,” not emptied out, so as to be elevated to the 
Absolute. Hegel says, “ Just as the sun sets in the west, so it is in the 
West that human being descends into itself, into its own subjectivi­
ty.” 36 It is this “ immediate-immediacy” which is the reason J. N. 
Findlay rightly charges Buddhism with being a “ negative” religion. 
The Buddhist Great Enlightenment of the “ negative ultimate”  (Tae- 
hae-tal, Ku-kyung-mu-shim-jie, or fanyatd) Findlay believes to be a 
defective feature when it comes to moral philosophy in that it deals 
fundamentally with values, i.e., axiology. It seems to be true, as 
Findlay argues, that because of the ontological “ emptiness”  of Bud­
dhism the axiological assessment of contingent and finite things in 
mundane life is “ emptied out” along with the former. In consequence, 
the “ richness” of mundane life is by and large neglected. As Findlay 
says, “ We cannot make this life wholly void, for pulsating richness 
rather than emptiness is [the] suitable characterization of the abso­
lute.” 37
One may argue that Buddhist “ emptiness” is not “ empty empti­
ness” as is commonly and mistakenly conceived by the Western mind, 
but is “ full emptiness.” 38 Findlay does not disagree with this positive 
meaning of “ emptiness.” Nevertheless, he argues that the “ empti­
ness” can be “ full emptiness” only to those who have attained enlight­
enment. As NagSrjuna pointed out, the danger of the misuse of this 
concept of “ emptiness” is analogous to the detrimental danger of 
grasping a poisonous snake in the wrong way.39 Likewise, Findlay 
warns against the negative result of its possible misuse. To this extent, 
Findlay seems to be right in saying that Buddhism is solipsistic in the 
same way as Wittgensteinian philosophy. Findlay says, “ ‘Do what 
you like’, say the later Buddhists to the truly emancipated man, even if 
this means meat-eating or sexual intercourse: ‘say what you like’, says
“  Ibid., p. 260.
17 J. N. Findlay, Ascent to the A bsolute (New York: Allen Unwin, 1970), p. 161.
M For this, see Frederick J. Streng, Emptiness: A  Study in Religious Meaning 
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967).
19 NagArjuna, Madyamikakarika, 24.
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Wittgenstein to the truly liberated speaker, even if  this means talking 
about a metaphysician. In neither case will you do or say things as they 
are done or said by the unenlightened, unemancipated individual.” 40
The “ immediate immediate”  o f the enlightenment o f subitism must 
be sublated into the “ mediated immediate”  in the Hegelian sense if it is 
to avoid falling into the trap of “ negativism” and “ solipsism.”
CONCLUSION: FROM EMPTINESS TO RICHNESS
sni
Given the fact that the very spirit of Son (C h’an in Chinese, Zen in 
Japanese) lies in the renunciation of any logical or theoretical system, 
this paper may well be another absurd intellectual attempt to name the 
“ unnameable.”  However, by no means do I argue that what cannot be 
named is irrelevant to the philosophical discussion nor do I, for that 
reason, argue that what cannot be named, has no truth in itself. Quite 
the contrary I argue that there is indeed a mystical, transcendental 
realm which cannot be fully comprehended by our phenomenally con­
ditioned, empirical knowledge. In that sense I agree with the earlier 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, that “ what we cannot speak o f we must pass 
over in silence.” 41 However, 1 would argue that what cannot be spoken 
of must not be dismissed nor should we disdain what can be spoken of 
as a useless or valueless activity. Thus we must avoid the danger o f one­
sided mysticism, not because of its profundity of Transcendentality, 
but because of its neglect of the empirical knowledge as incomplete 
when, in fact, transcendental enlightenment would not make sense 
without it.
Thus I would argue that though we must pass over in silence what 
cannot be said, we must say and think clearly what can be said. Kant, 
knowing the limits of our empirical knowledge about the transcenden­
tal Noumena, does not dismiss our phenomenal knowledge as an illu­
sion, but instead sustains and values it. The insight o f Kant’s “ transcen­
dental illusion”  instructs us to see phenomena as illusion, but only as a
*  J. N. Findlay, “ My Encounter of Wittgenstein,’’ in Studies in the Philosophy o f 
J. N. Findlay, ed. Robert S. Cohen, ct al. (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1985), p. 67.
41 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. 
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positive factor in our conditioned world. For example, Kant says that 
though we know that it is illusory to see the moon higher at the horizon 
than at the shore, because we see it through higher light rays, we can­
not be prevented from seeing it that way. Nor can an astronomer pre­
vent the moon from appearing larger at its rising, although he is not de­
ceived by this illusion.42 As the Kantian “ transcendental illusion*1 does 
not cease even after it has been detected,43 so also even after the discov­
ery of our illusoriness in an attempt to analyze the subitism-gradualism 
debate from the logical and phenomenological point of view, we must 
not “ empty out*’ this “ transcendental illusion’* into the “ emptiness*’ 
of Buddhism in a “ negative*’ sense of the term. In order for the Bud­
dhist “ emptiness” to be “ positively” empty, the empirical and intellec­
tual discourses are to be valued as much as the “ mystical”  and “ tran­
scendental” aspects of enlightenment.
In conclusion I suggest that Buddhists complement the solipsistic, 
exclusive, and transcendentalistic subitism in light of communalistic, 
inclusive, and immanent philosophy of Hegel. Thus I maintain that a 
sound understanding of Buddhist “ immediate enlightenment,*’ whose 
ultimate is characterized as “ emptiness” (JQnyatO), must not “ empty 
out” the mediated, the mundane, contingent features of gradual culti­
vation. The “ transcendental” Ku-kyung-mu-shim-jie (The Great En­
lightenment) of subitism must not exclude what it transcends. As Nir­
vana is not something which exists separately from samsara, but grows 
out of samsara, and to that extent is samsara, the exclusive Transcen­
dence, the exclusive subitism which cuts itself off from the inclusive 
gradualism which is the very part of itself, cannot be sustained.
42 Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New 
York: St Martin’s Press, 1965), A  297.
41 Ibid.
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